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Abstract
This paper examines the bad luck explanation for changing volatility in U.S. in-
ﬂation and output when agents do not have rational expectations, but instead form
expectations through least squares learning with an endogenously changing learning
gain. It has been suggested that this type of endogenously changing learning mecha-
nism can create periods of excess volatility without the need for changes in the variance
of the underlying shocks. Bad luck is modeled into a standard New Keynesian model
by augmenting it with two states that evolve according to a Markov chain, where one
state is characterized by large variances for structural shocks, and the other state has
relatively smaller variances. To assess whether learning can explain the Great Mod-
eration, the New Keynesian model with volatility regime switching and dynamic gain
learning is estimated by maximum likelihood. The results show that learning does lead
to lower variances for the shocks in the volatile regime, but changes in regime is still
signiﬁcant in diﬀerences in volatility from the 1970s and after the the 1980s.
Keywords: Learning, regime switching, great moderation, New Keynesian model, max-
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JEL classiﬁcation: C13, E31, E50.
∗I am grateful for the advice and guidance of Eric Leeper, Kim Huynh, Brian Peterson, and Todd
Walker; for useful conversations with Fabio Milani and Bruce Preston; and for comments by the participants
of Indiana University economics department seminars. All errors are my own.
†Mailing address: 100 S Woodlawn, Bloomington, IN 47405. E-mail address: jmmurray@indiana.edu.
Phone number : (574)315-0459.
Regime Switching, Learning, and the Great Moderation 1
1 Introduction
Figure 1 shows plots of the U.S. output gap, the percentage diﬀerence between the actual
level of real GDP and potential GDP, and the inﬂation rate, as measured by the annualized
quarterly growth rate of the GDP deﬂator. Aside from standard business cycle ﬂuctuations,
the data exhibits prolonged periods of diﬀering degrees of volatility. Output and inﬂation
are especially volatile during the 1970s and early 1980s, and there has been a subsequent
decline in volatility since that period. Kim and Nelson (1999a) estimate that since the ﬁrst
quarter of 1984, there has been a permanently smaller diﬀerence between the growth rate of
output during expansions and during recessions.
Macroeconomics has had diﬃculty explaining this Great Moderation, as it has come to
be called. The leading explanations for the change in volatility fall into two groups: good vs.
bad monetary policy, and good vs. bad luck. Using a standard New Keynesian model, Lubik
and Schorfheide (2004) ﬁnd empirical evidence of a change in monetary policy from bad to
good, occurring sometime between 1979 and 1982. They ﬁnd that prior to 1979, the Federal
Reserve did not adjust the federal funds rate by more than one-to-one with inﬂation, and
therefore under rational expectations, the equilibrium was indeterminate and the economy
was subject to sunspot shocks which led to greater volatility.
Many studies ﬁnd that a change in monetary policy is not enough to explain the change
in volatility. Sims and Zha (2006) ﬁnd that evidence that changes in U.S. volatility is
better explained by changes in luck than changes in monetary policy. Using a structural
vector autoregression model with minimal identiﬁcation restrictions so that it can possibly
encompass many sorts of linear dynamic macroeconomic models with a monetary policy rule,
they ﬁnd the best ﬁtting model is one in which there are no regime changes in the coeﬃcients
describing monetary policy or economic behavior, and there are only regime changes in the
variance of the exogenous shocks. Stock and Watson (2003) similarly ﬁnd that improved
monetary policy accounts for only a small part of the slowdown in macroeconomic volatility
since 1984.
A third explanation that is just recently receiving some attention in the literature is that
expectations that evolve according to least squares learning can lead to changing periods of
volatility. Under least squares learning, agents do not know the structural form or parameters
that govern the economy. Not being able to form rational expectations, they estimate least
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squares autoregressions using past data, and use this econometric model to forecast future
variables.
Milani (2007a) estimates a New Keynesian model with least squares learning and when
splitting the sample at the same dates as Lubik and Schorfheide (2004), ﬁnds there is little
evidence of a change in monetary policy and estimates the federal funds rate did adjust by
more than one-to-one with inﬂation throughout the sample.
Primiceri (2005) demonstrates how learning on the part of the central bank can be per-
ceived as bad monetary policy. In an empirically founded model of unemployment rate and
inﬂation determination he shows how mis-perceptions by the central bank about the natural
rate of unemployment and the degree of persistence of inﬂation led to a bad policy prescrip-
tion during the 1970s, and therefore excessively volatile unemployment and inﬂation. As
time progressed and more data became available, the Federal Reserve learned its mistakes
and eventually provided better policy, leading to a slowdown in macroeconomic volatility
after the mid-1980s. Stock and Watson (2003) provide some evidence for such an explana-
tion when they demonstrate that univariate least squares forecasts have been more precise
during less volatile periods.
Unlike previous papers in the learning literature, this paper estimates a model that
combines the bad luck explanation along with learning to determine whether learning leads
to a diﬀerent prediction on the amount of bad luck needed to generate the changes in volatility
seen in U.S. data. Previous papers in the learning literature have allowed volatility to be
aﬀected only by learning dynamics, so it is not clear whether these explanations trump the
bad luck explanation. Changes in luck is modeled by assuming the variances of exogenous
structural shocks are determined by a regime switching process with two states. One state is
characterized by large variances of the shocks and the other has relatively smaller variances.
Being in the volatile state is considered bad luck as the states evolve exogenously according
to a Markov chain were the current state is only dependent on the previous state, and the
probabilities of switching between states is exogenous.
Agents do not have rational expectations, and are therefore completely unaware of any
regime switching processes. Agents do remain suspect that structural changes may occur,
but they do not have any knowledge about what types of structural changes are possible,
or any idea with what probabilities structural changes can occur. Expectations therefore
evolve according to a process similar to the Marcet and Nicolini (2003) framework where
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the weight agents give to older observations is endogenous. Speciﬁcally, agents begin using a
decreasing learning gain which consistent with forming ordinary least squares forecasts and
having no suspicion of structural change. If recent forecast errors become larger than the
historical average, agents then suspect a structural change may have occurred and therefore
increase their learning gain, giving larger weight to current observations which are believed
to have more likely occurred after a structural break.
While a constant learning gain is theoretically capable of producing time varying volatil-
ity, in Murray (2007) I show in a New Keynesian model with no regime changes that constant
gain learning is not able to deliver dynamics of U.S. inﬂation and output much better than
rational expectations, and both frameworks especially fail to explain the excess volatility of
the 1970s. Milani (2007b) simulates a model using parameters estimated with U.S. data that
includes the endogenously changing learning gain similar to that suggested by Marcet and
Nicolini (2003) and ﬁnds that this type of learning can produce heteroskedasticity in output
and inﬂation that rational expectations simulations cannot. Moreover, his estimates imply
that during most of the 1970s decade, agents suspected structural change and therefore used
a high learning gain.
This paper builds on Milani's analysis by also allowing for recurrent regime changes in
the volatility of the structural shocks. Estimation of this model decomposes the changes in
volatility into changes in the volatility of structural shocks and endogenous changes in the
learning gain. The main ﬁnding is that learning indeed leads to much smaller variances of
structural shocks in the volatile regime. However, changes in regime are still signiﬁcant and
the learning frameworks and rational expectation framework make similar predictions to the
periods in U.S. history when the economy was in the volatile regime. Despite the ability for
learning to explain much of the volatility, the change in the dynamic gain appears to play
an insigniﬁcant role, and the rational expectations model dominates the learning models in
terms of its ﬁt to the data.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the New Keynesian framework and
regime switching process. Section 3 describes the learning process and how constant gain
learning and dynamic gain learning can generate time varying volatility. Section 4 describes
the data and estimation procedure. Section 5 presents the estimation results and interprets
the ﬁndings, and section 6 concludes.
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2 Model
The crucial extensions of learning with an endogenously changing gain and a Markov chain
process for changes in structural volatility are incorporated into a standard New Keynesian
model of output and inﬂation determination and monetary policy. This section describes the
rational expectations version New Keynesian model and the next section introduces learning
in the linearized version of the model.1
There are a continuum of consumers types on the unit interval, and a continuum of
intermediate goods producers on the same unit interval. Each consumer type has a speciﬁc
labor skill that is only hired by the corresponding intermediate goods producer. It is assumed
there are a number of consumers of each type, so that no consumer has market power over
the wage, and that there are an equal number of consumers in each type, so that relative
output levels of intermediate goods do not depend on the distribution of consumer types.
There is one ﬁnal good that is used for consumption, and produced using all the interme-
diate goods. The intermediate goods are imperfect substitutes for each other in production,
therefore intermediate goods ﬁrms are monopolistically competitive. Prices for intermediate
goods are subject to a Calvo (1983) pricing friction where only a fraction of ﬁrms are able to
re-optimize their price every period, and the ﬁrms fortunate to do so is randomly determined,
independently of ﬁrms' histories.
2.1 Consumers
Each consumer type has a speciﬁc labor skill that can only be hired by a speciﬁc intermediate
goods producing ﬁrm. Since each intermediate goods ﬁrm has a diﬀerent labor demand, wage
income will be diﬀerent for each consumer type. However, given a perfect asset market,
consumption will be equal across all consumers. Each consumer type i ∈ (0, 1) maximizes
utility,
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
 1
1− 1
σ
ξt (ct − ηct−1)1−
1
σ − 1
1 + 1
µ
nt(i)
1+ 1
µ
 ,
1This methodology is perhaps the most common means for putting learning into macroeconomic models,
but Preston (2005) demonstrates that since the least squares expectations operator does not follow the law
of iterated expectations, this method is not consistent with learning inherent in the microfoundations of the
model.
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subject to the budget constraint,
ct + bt(i) =
1 + rt−1
1 + pit
bt−1(i) +
wt(i)
pt
nt(i) + Πt − τt.
Consumption at time t, given by ct, is not indexed by individual type i since it is equal across
all agents. The remaining variables include ξt, which is an aggregate preference shock, nt(i)
and wt(i)/pt are the labor supply and real wage of individual i at time t, respectively, bt(i) is
individual i's purchase of real government bonds at time t, rt is the nominal interest rate paid
on government bonds, pit is the inﬂation rate of the price of the ﬁnal good, Πt is the value
of proﬁts earned by owning stock in ﬁrms, and τt is the value of real lump sum taxes. The
preference parameters are σ ∈ (0,∞), which is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution,
µ ∈ (0,∞), which is the elasticity of labor supply, and η ∈ [0, 1), which is the degree of habit
formation.
Habit formation is added to the model because it introduces a source of consumption (and
therefore output) persistence that has been found to be signiﬁcant in rational expectations
models. For example, Smets and Wouters (2005) estimate a rational expectations New
Keynesian model with numerous extensions for both the United States and Euro area and
ﬁnd point estimates for the degree of habit formation very close to unity. Furthermore,
Fuhrer (2000) ﬁnds that habit formation leads to hump shaped impulse response functions
that can be supported by the data. The importance of habit formation may not be so
important when dropping the assumption of rational expectations. Milani (2007a) shows
that under learning the estimate for the degree of habit formation falls close to zero.
Log-linearizing the consumers' ﬁrst order conditions leads to the following Euler equation,
λˆt = Etλˆt+1 + rˆt − Etpit+1, (1)
where a hat indicates the percentage deviation of the variable from its steady state.2 Here,
λˆt is the marginal utility of real income, given by,
λˆt =
1
(1− βη)(1− η)
[
βησEtcˆt+1 − σ(1 + βη2)cˆt + σηcˆt−1
]
+
(
ξˆt − βηEtξˆt+1
)
. (2)
2A hat is omitted from inﬂation because it will be necessary to assume the steady state inﬂation rate is
equal to zero when log-linearizing the ﬁrms' proﬁt maximizing conditions.
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2.2 Production
There is one ﬁnal good used for consumption and investment which is sold in a perfectly
competitive market and produced with a continuum of intermediate goods. The production
function is given by,
yt =
[∫ 1
0
yt(i)
θ−1
θ di
] θ
θ−1
, (3)
where yt is the output of the ﬁnal good, yt(i) is intermediate good i, and θ ∈ (1,∞) is the
elasticity of substitution in production. Proﬁt maximization leads to the demand for each
intermediate good,
yt(i) =
[
pt(i)
pt
]−θ
yt, (4)
where pt(i) is the price of intermediate good i and pt is the price of the ﬁnal good. Substi-
tuting equation (4) into (3) leads to a consumption price index that holds in equilibrium,
pt =
[∫ 1
0
pt(i)
1−θdi
] 1
1−θ
. (5)
Each intermediate good is produced according the constant returns to scale production
function yt(i) = ζtnt(i), where ζt is an exogenous technology shock common to all ﬁrms.
Given a level of production yt(i), ﬁrms choose labor demand to minimize total cost
wt(i)
pt
nt(i).
When labor markets clear, it can be shown that ﬁrm i's optimal choice for labor leads to the
log-linearized marginal cost of ﬁrm i equal to,
ψˆt(i) =
1
µ
yˆt(i)− λˆt −
(
1
µ
+ 1
)
ζˆt. (6)
Summing equation (6) across all ﬁrms leads to the average marginal cost in the economy,
ψˆt =
1
µ
yˆt − λˆt −
(
1
µ
+ 1
)
ζˆt. (7)
Firms' pricing decisions are subject to the Calvo (1983) pricing friction, where only a
constant fraction of ﬁrms are able to re-optimize their in a given period. I suppose that ﬁrms
who are not able to re-optimize their price may adjust their price by a fraction, γ, of the
previous period's inﬂation rate. Let ω ∈ (0, 1) denote the fraction of ﬁrms who are not able
to re-optimize their prices each period. Since these speciﬁc ﬁrms are randomly determined,
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ωT is the probability a ﬁrm will not be able to re-optimize its price for T consecutive periods.
A ﬁrm who is able to re-optimize its price maximizes the following present discounted utility
value of proﬁts earned while the ﬁrm is unable to re-optimize its price again:
E∗t
∞∑
T=0
(ωβ)T
λt+T
λt
{(
pt(i)pi
∗
t+T
pt+T
)
yt+T (i)−Ψ [yt+T (i)]
}
, (8)
where Ψ [yt+T (i)] is the real total cost function of producing yt+T (i) units, given the optimal
decision for labor, and pi∗t+T =
∏T
j=1(1+γpit+j−1) is degree to which the ﬁrm's price is able to
adjust according to inﬂation indexation. It can be shown that the ﬁrst order condition for
pt(i) combined with the ﬁnal good price index, equation (5), leads to the log-linear Phillips
equation,
pit =
1
1 + βγ
[
γpit−1 + βEtpit+1 +
µ(1− ω)(1− ωβ)
ω(µ+ θ)
ψˆt
]
(9)
2.3 Fully Flexible Prices
To take this model to data on the output gap it is convenient to rewrite the model in terms
of the diﬀerence from the outcome in which there are no nominal rigidities. Let y˜t = yˆt− yˆft
and λ˜t = λˆt − λˆft denote the percentage deviation of output and marginal utility from their
fully ﬂexible price outcome. Under fully ﬂexible prices the linearized Euler equation, (1),
and marginal utility of income, (2), still hold. Using these conditions and imposing goods
market equilibrium condition implies,
λ˜t = Etλ˜t+1 + rˆt − Etpit+1 − rnt , (10)
λ˜t =
1
(1− βη)(1− η)
[
βησEty˜t+1 − σ(1 + βη2)y˜t + σηy˜t−1
]
, (11)
where rnt is the percentage deviation of natural interest rate from its steady state. The
natural interest rate is the interest rate that would occur under fully ﬂexible prices. I
suppose that rnt follows the stochastic exogenous process,
rnt = ρnr
n
t−1 + n,t, (12)
where n,t is an independently and identically distributed shock.
When prices are fully ﬂexible, ω = 0 in the maximization problem given in equation
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(8). It can be shown in this case that the ﬁrst order condition implies the marginal cost is
identical for every ﬁrm and always constant. Under fully ﬂexible prices equation (7) implies,
ψˆft = 0 =
1
µ
yˆft − λˆft −
(
1
µ
+ 1
)
ζˆt.
One can solve this equation for ζˆt and substitute that back into the equation for marginal
cost (7). Plugging this expression for marginal cost into equation (9) yields the following
Phillips curve in terms of the output gap,
pit =
1
1 + βγ
[
γpit−1 + βEtpit+1 +
(1− ω)(1− ωβ)
ω(µ+ θ)
(y˜t − µλ˜t)
]
. (13)
While this expression for the Phillips curve is not subject to a structural shock, when esti-
mating the model by maximum likelihood it is convenient to have a shock here to avoid the
problem of stochastic singularity. The Phillips curve is amended with a cost-push shock
so the form that is estimated is given by,
pit =
1
1 + βγ
[
γpit−1 + βEtpit+1 + κ(y˜t − µλ˜t) + ut
]
, (14)
where κ is the reduced form coeﬃcient on the marginal cost and ut is an exogenous cost-push
shock that evolves according to,
ut = ρuut−1 + u,t, (15)
where u,t is an independently and identically distributed shock.
2.4 Monetary Policy
The nominal interest rate is determined jointly with output and inﬂation by monetary policy.
In this paper I assume the monetary authority follows a Taylor (1993) type rule of the form,
rˆt = ρrrˆt−1 + (1− ρr) (ψpiEtpit+1 + ψyEty˜t+1) + r,t (16)
where ρr ∈ [0, 1) is a degree of interest rate smoothing desired by the monetary authority,
ψpi ∈ (0,∞) is the feedback on the interest rate to expected inﬂation, ψy ∈ (0,∞) is the
feedback on the interest rate to the expected output gap, and r,t is an independently and
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identically distributed exogenous monetary policy shock.
2.5 Regime Switching
The bad luck explanation for why the United States experienced periods of excessive volatility
is that the variances of the structural shocks were larger during these periods. To model
this explanation in the framework of the New Keynesian model I suppose the variance of
the natural interest rate shock n,t, the cost push shock, u,t, and the monetary policy shock
r,t are determined by two states. Let state L, denoted by sL, be the state where the shocks
have low volatility, and state H, denoted by sH , be the state where the shocks have high
volatility.
The variances of the structural innovations in a given state are independently normally
distributed with mean zero and variances given by,
V ar [t(st)] =


σ2n,L 0 0
0 σ2u,L 0
0 0 σ2r,L
 , if st = L

σ2n,H 0 0
0 σ2u,H 0
0 0 σ2r,H
 , if st = H

, (17)
where t(st)
′ = [n,t(st) u,t(st) r,t(st)], and the variances in the high volatility state are
greater than or equal to the variances in the low volatility state.
The state st evolves according to a two state Markov chain. Let pj ∈ (0, 1) denote the
probability of staying in state j at time t, given the economy is at state j at time t− 1, for
j ∈ {L,H}. This implies that the probability of moving from state i in t − 1 to state j in
time t, where i 6= j is given by 1 − pj . The state then evolves according to the transition
matrix,
P =
 pL 1− pL
1− pH pH
 . (18)
Let S ′t = [P (st = L) P (st = H)] denote the probability of being in each state at any given
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time t. The transition matrix assumes the state evolves according to,
EtSt+1 = PSt (19)
Notice this regime switching framework makes the somewhat restrictive assumption that
all structural shocks are always in the same regime. A less restrictive assumption would
be that one or more shocks could be in one regime while one or more others could be in
another regime. Such a setup would require specifying a transition matrix for each structural
shock. If one assumed that the diﬀerent shocks transitioned between regimes independently
of one another, this would introduce four more parameters to be estimated. If one wanted
to generalize the process so that there is some dependence, this would involve even more
parameters. To keep the number of parameters to estimate tractable, and to avoid over-
ﬁtting the data, I assume that all shocks are in the same regime in a given time period.
3 Learning
Instead of having rational expectations, agents form expectations by estimating least squares
regression models, where expectations of future output and inﬂation are given by the forecasts
from these models. Agents are assumed to have no knowledge of the structural form of the
economy, the parameters that govern the economy, or the regime switching process. They do
know the reduced form of the economy follows a VAR(1) process, and they use this model
and past data to form their forecasts.
The model in the previous section only allows for structural changes in the volatility
in the shocks, and since the model is linearized, agents are indiﬀerent to the additional
risk. Even so, I suppose that agents suspect that structural changes of unknown types are
possible so they may decide to give more weight to recent observations in their estimation
procedure. One way to model this is to use constant gain learning, which is consistent with
agents using forecasts based on weighted least squares estimates, where the weights decline
geometrically with the age of the observations. With a constant gain, the weight put on the
latest observation is always the same, regardless of how much data the agents already have
for their forecasts. One beneﬁt of this type of learning is that learning dynamics persist in
the long run.
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Authors such as Sargent (1999) and Evans and Honkapohja (2001) has suggested that
constant gain learning is a natural way to model expectations in a real world where structural
changes, perhaps large or small, are always possible. The drawback of constant gain learn-
ing is that it implies agents always have the same level of suspicion for structural changes,
regardless of recent macroeconomic activity or the size of recent forecast errors. If agents
instead use ordinary least squares (OLS), then the weight agents give to additional obser-
vations diminishes as their sample size approaches inﬁnity. Said another way, the learning
gain decreases and approaches zero as time approaches inﬁnity, causing learning dynamics
to disappear completely in the long run. Learning with OLS also implies that agents believe
structural changes that should impact their decisions are impossible.
Constant gain learning can in theory lead to time varying volatility of expectations, and
therefore time varying volatility for output and inﬂation. This aﬀect depends on the size of
the constant learning gain, but for empirically plausible values, this type of learning fails to
deliver very big eﬀects. Williams (2003) ﬁnds this to be the case in a simple model with
simulated data and Murray (2007) estimates that constant gain learning provides dynamics
very similar to rational expectations.
Marcet and Nicolini (2003) suggest an alternative way to model dynamic expectations.
Instead of assuming that agents never suspect a structural change, as is consistent with
OLS, or assuming that agents always suspect a structural change with equal likelihood, as
is consistent with a constant gain, they take a mixture of these methods where the learning
gain changes endogenously. Suppose agents begin with no suspicion of recent structural
changes. As time progresses they form their expectations using a decreasing learning gain
consistent with OLS. Agents will suspect a structural change may have occurred if recent
forecast errors are larger than historical averages. When this happens, agents switch to a
larger learning gain, which puts more weight on the most recent observations, ones that are
believed to have more likely occurred after a structural change. As long as forecast errors
are large, the learning gain remains at this high point. When forecast errors start becoming
small, the learning gain decreases at a rate consistent with OLS. I explain in more detail
the endogenous learning gain process below, but ﬁrst it is ﬁrst necessary to explain speciﬁc
details of least squares learning in the framework of a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
model like the New Keynesian model in Section 2.
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3.1 Least Squares Learning
The log-linearized model in Section 2 can be expressed in the general form:
Ω0xt = Ω1xt−1 + Ω2E∗t xt+1 +Ψzt, (20)
zt = Azt−1 + t(st) (21)
where E∗t denotes possibly non-rational expectations, xt is a vector of minimum state vari-
ables, and zt is a vector of structural shocks. For the New Keynesian model, xt = [y˜t pit rˆt λ˜t]
′
and zt = [r
n
t ut r,t]
′. The minimum state variable solution of the model implies the rational
expectation for xt+1 is given by,
Etxt+1 = Gxt +HEtzt+1, (22)
where the elements of the matrices G and H are a function of the parameters of the model
and may be determined by the method of undetermined coeﬃcients. Agents that learn do not
know the structural form or the parameters that govern the economy, but do use the reduced
form of the economy for their forecasting model. Agents' information sets are restricted only
to past data on xt, so they are unable to collect data on past structural shocks to estimate
matrix H. Therefore, agents collect past data on xt to form least squares estimates for the
non-zero columns of G.
Agents do know what columns of G are equal to zero, and therefore do not use the
associated variables as explanatory variables in their regression. In terms of the New Key-
nesian model in the previous section, the only non-zero column of G is that which multiplies
past marginal utility of income, λ˜t. When there is a positive degree of habit formation, not
only are expectations of next period's output important for consumers' decisions, so is next
period's future marginal utility of income which involves a two period ahead forecast for
output. Since the only sources of persistence in the model are on output (habit formation),
inﬂation (price indexation), and the interest rate (monetary policy smoothing), these are the
only variables whose lags agents use as explanatory variables.
The timing in which agents make expectations and decisions in a given period is as
follows. At the beginning of period t agents wake up with data realized through period
t − 1. They collect this data and use the least squares estimate for G to make forecasts
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for future realizations of variables such as output and inﬂation. Given these expectations,
agents consumption and pricing decisions are implemented and only then do time t outcomes
become realized. In the next period, these outcomes become available as data to the agents,
and the process begins again.
There is no constant term in the general form of the model, equation (20), or in the
rational expectation, given in equation (22), since all variables are expressed in terms of
percentage deviations from the steady state or ﬂexible price outcome. Since agents are
not endowed with information about the parameters of the model, it is realistic to suppose
that agents also estimate a constant term in equation (22). Let Gˆ∗t denote agents' time t
estimate for the non-zero columns of matrix G and a column for a constant term so that
Gˆ∗t = [gˆt Gˆ
NZ
t ], where gˆt is the time t estimate of the constant term and Gˆ
NZ
t is the time t
estimate for the non-zero columns of G.
If agents use OLS, then,
(
Gˆ∗t
)′
=
(
1
t− 1
t−1∑
τ=1
x∗τ−1x
∗
τ−1
′
)−1 (
1
t− 1
t−1∑
τ=1
x∗τ−1x
′
τ
)
, (23)
where x∗
′
t = [1 x
NZ′
t ] is the vector of explanatory variables agents use. Agents form the
expectation,
E∗t xt+1 = gˆt + GˆtE
∗
t xt = (I + Gˆt)gˆ0,t + Gˆ
2
txt−1, (24)
where Gˆt denotes the time t estimate for G obtained from Gˆ
∗
t with the zero columns ﬁlled
back in. The least squares estimate for Gˆ∗t can be rewritten in the following recursive form:
Gˆ∗t = Gˆ
∗
t−1 + gt(xt−1 − Gˆ∗t−1x∗t−2)x∗t−2′R−1t , (25)
Rt = Rt−1 + gt(x∗t−2x
∗
t−2
′ −Rt−1), (26)
where gt = 1/(t− 1) is the learning gain.3 The recursive form shows precisely how expecta-
tions are adaptive. The term enclosed in parentheses in equation (25) is the realized forecast
error for the previous estimate Gˆ∗t−1. The degree to which agents adjust their expectations
depends on the size of this forecast error, the variance of the estimated coeﬃcients, captured
by the inverse of matrix Rt, and the size of the learning gain, gt. The larger is the learning
3To show this, let Rt = 1t−1
∑t−1
τ=1 x
∗
τ−1x
∗′
τ−1 and
(
Gˆ∗t
)′
= R−1t
(
1
t−1
∑t−1
τ=1 x
∗
τ−2x
′
τ−1
)
.
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gain, the more expectations respond to the latest forecast error. When agents use OLS, gt
approaches zero as time approaches inﬁnity. Under constant gain learning, gt remains at
some constant level, g, so the degree to which new observations can aﬀect expectations is
always the same.
Substituting the expectation in equation (24) into the structural form, (20), leads to the
following evolution for xt,
xt = Ω
−1
0 Ω2(I + Gˆt)gˆ0,t + Ω
−1
0
(
Ω1 + Ω2Gˆ
2
t
)
xt−1 + Ω−10 Ψzt, (27)
where gˆ0,t and Gˆt are determined by the learning process in equations (25) and (26).
This form illustrates how learning with a positive learning gain can lead to time-varying
volatility for xt even if with a constant variance for zt. Unlike standard rational expectations
models, the constant term and matrix multiplying xt−1 are time-varying. The magnitude
of these matrices depends on the size of the learning gain and the size of agents' forecast
errors. Time variation in these matrices causes time variation in the volatility of xt. Note
this is true for any non-zero value for the learning gain gt. Even a constant learning gain
can technically generate time-varying volatility, but time variation in the learning gain has
been suggested by Marcet and Nicolini (2003) and Milani (2007b) to better explain such
phenomenon.
3.2 Dynamic Gain Learning
Under a mixed learning framework, the learning gain gt decreases over time, but may en-
dogenously jump to a higher level when forecast errors are especially large. Let αt ≡ 1/gt
be the inverse of the learning gain, which under ordinary least squares is interpreted as the
sample size. The learning gain is assumed to evolve according to,
αt =

αt−1 + 1 if
1
J
J∑
j=1
1
n
n∑
v=1
∣∣∣xt−j(v)− Gˆ∗t−j(v)x∗t−j−1∣∣∣ < νt
α otherwise
 (28)
where n denotes the number of variables in the model, xt−j(v) denotes the vth element of
xt−j and Gˆ∗t−j(v) denotes the vth row of Gˆ
∗
t−j, which is used to forecast variable v. The
parameter J is the number of recent periods agents look at when deciding to change their
Regime Switching, Learning, and the Great Moderation 15
learning gain. Marcet and Nicolini (2003) assume J = 1, so that agents may change their
learning gain looking at only the most recent forecast error. I ﬁx J = 8, so for quarterly data
agents examine the forecast errors from the most recent two years and adjust the learning
gain if the average forecast error during this time is too large. The variable ν ∈ (0,∞) is
the threshold for how large the forecast errors must be to induce agents to increase their
learning gain. Similar to Milani (2007b) this threshold is set equal to the average size of
forecast errors up through date t− 1, which is given by,
νt =
1
t− 1
t−1∑
j=1
1
n
n∑
v=1
∣∣∣xt−j(v)− Gˆ∗t−j(v)x∗t−j−1∣∣∣ .
Since forecast errors for each variable v is given as a percentage deviation from the steady
state or potential, they are added up over all the variables that agents forecast. This learning
mechanism can nest the special cases when agents always use OLS or always use a constant
gain. To restrict agents to always use OLS, νt can be set to zero for all t. To restrict agents
to always use a constant gain, νt can be set to inﬁnity for all t.
This learning mechanism introduces one additional parameter to estimate jointly with
the parameters of the New Keynesian model and regime switching process, the threshold
learning gain, g ≡ 1/α.
4 Estimation
The model is estimated with quarterly U.S. from 1960:Q1 through 2007:Q1 on the output gap,
as measured by the congressional budget oﬃce, the inﬂation rate of the GDP deﬂator, and
the Federal Funds rate. The model conforms to a state-space representation with Markov-
switching in the variance of the error term and is estimated using the Kim and Nelson
(1999b) technique for combining the Kalman ﬁlter that evaluates a state-space model with
the Hamilton (1989) ﬁlter for evaluating Markov-switching processes.
4.1 Maximum Likelihood Procedure
The state side of the model is given by equations (27) and (21). Let GAPt denote data on
the output gap, INFt denote data on inﬂation, and FFt denote data on the Federal Funds
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rate. The observation equations are given by,
GAPt = 100y˜t,
INFt = pi
∗ + 400pit,
FFt = r
∗ + pi∗ + 400rˆt.
The state variables are multiplied by 100 to convert the decimals into percentages, and the
inﬂation rate and federal funds rate are multiplied by 4 to convert the quarterly rates to
annualized rates. The New Keynesian model assumes that the steady state inﬂation rate is
equal to zero, but since this is not likely the case in the data, the annualized steady state
inﬂation rate, given by pi∗, is estimated along with the other parameters of the model. The
steady state gross real interest rate is set equal to the inverse of the discount factor; therefore
r∗ = 400(1− 1/β).
The log-likelihood is maximized with respect to the threshold learning gain, g, the
Markov-switching probabilities, ph and pL, the parameters of the New Keynesian model,
and the variances of the structural shocks for each regime. The discount factor is not esti-
mated but instead ﬁxed to β = 0.99 which implies a steady state real interest rate of about
4%. The elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods, θ, and the degree of price
ﬂexibility, ω, appear multiplicatively in the Phillips curve (13) and so only the reduced form
coeﬃcient, κ, is estimated. Before revealing the estimation results, it is ﬁrst necessary to
specify how initial conditions for the learning process are set.
4.2 Initial Conditions
Aside from standard initial conditions for the Kalman ﬁlter and Hamilton ﬁlter, it is necessary
to specify initial conditions for the learning process given in equations (25) and (26). How
values are set for initial expectation matrices, gˆ0, Gˆ
∗
0, and R0, can have a dramatic eﬀects
on the estimation results. Despite this dependence, there is little general consensus for how
initial expectations should be speciﬁed.
Williams (2003) and Murray (2007) show that using the rational expectations solution for
initial expectations produces nearly identical dynamics as assuming expectations are rational
throughout the sample. Given the model is E-stable, this result is not too surprising. If the
conditions for E-stability are met, under a decreasing learning gain consistent with OLS, the
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model will converge to the rational expectations solution when in the neighborhood of this
solution.
Most initialization methods are therefore based on pre-sample evidence. Slobodyan and
Wouters (2007) estimate the rational expectations version of the model on pre-sample data,
and use the implied expectations as the initial condition for the sample. Milani (2007a,
2007b) sets the initial conditions for the learning matrices equal to VAR(1) estimates from
de-meaned pre-sample data. Similarly, I estimate the appropriate regressions with pre-
sample data from 1954:Q2 through 1959:Q4. In the New Keynesian framework, agents
estimate four regression models for the following dependent variables: output gap, inﬂation
rate, interest rate, and marginal utility of income gap. Each of these variables depends on
lagged output gap, inﬂation rate, and interest rate. The data must ﬁrst be transformed into
the same terms as the state vector, xt. For the output gap, inﬂation rate, and interest rate
this is done according to:
y˜t =
1
100
GAPt
pit =
1
400
(INFt − pi∗),
rˆt =
1
400
(FFt − r∗ − pi∗).
(29)
Expectations for these ﬁrst three variables in the state vector is found by estimating a
VAR(1) on [y˜t pit rˆt]
′. Data for the marginal utility of income gap is found by plugging into
equation (11) data for the output gap, lagged output gap, and expected future output gap
predicted by the VAR(1). Expectations for λ˜t are then found by regressing this simulated
data on lagged [y˜t pit rˆt]
′.
5 Results
To analyze how learning and regime switching in volatility are related, the New Keynesian
model is estimated under rational expectations, constant gain learning, and dynamic gain
learning gain. Table 6 presents the parameter estimates for each case. Under constant
gain learning, the estimate for learning gain is essentially equal to zero. This implies that
expectations do not evolve through the sample. Even so, the predictions under constant
gain learning are not the same rational expectations, since the coeﬃcient matrices agents
use to form expectations are diﬀerent. The expectation matrices for the learning case are
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initialized to pre-sample VAR(1) results, which do not coincide with rational expectations.
The estimated threshold gain under dynamic gain learning has a very small point estimate,
g = 0.0045, but it is statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. This implies that expec-
tations do evolve over time, but the rate at which agents learn is very small.
Comparing the standard deviation of the shock processes illustrates how expectations
explain macroeconomic volatility. There is little diﬀerence in the predictions for the volatility
of the cost push and monetary policy shocks, but there is a substantial diﬀerence in the
volatility for the natural rate shock. For both the low and high volatility regime, the estimate
for the variance of the natural rate shock under rational expectations is almost twice as high
as under constant gain learning, and almost four times higher than under dynamic gain
learning. This implies that using the VAR(1) on pre-sample data to specify expectations
explains much of the volatility in output, but evolving expectations with dynamic learning
gain explains even more. The persistence of the natural rate shock is also somewhat larger
under rational expectations (ρn = 0.8705), than under dynamic gain learning (ρn = 0.7484)
or constant gain learning (ρn = 0.6936).
Other parameter estimates that diﬀer across models include the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution and the Phillips curve slope. The elasticity of substitution is approximately
σ = 0.0073 under rational expectations, σ = 0.2560 under dynamic gain learning, and
σ = 0.1824 under constant gain learning. This implies the intertemporal consumption trade-
oﬀ is much more sensitive to the expected real interest rate with the initial expectations for
the learning processes than under rational expectations. Moreover, dynamic gain learning
leads to an even higher estimate than the zero constant gain, although the diﬀerence is not
statistically signiﬁcant.
The estimates for the Phillips curve coeﬃcient reveals how learning dynamics can alter
the prediction for the degree of price ﬂexibility. The coeﬃcients under rational expectations
and constant gain learning are both very close to zero, which implies a very small degree
of price ﬂexibility. However, under the dynamic gain learning, the only framework in which
expectations are evolving, the Phillips curve coeﬃcient is much larger, implying a greater
degree of price ﬂexibility.
The Markov probabilities are very similar across the models. Both the low and high
volatility regimes are very persistent which implies changes in luck is still very important
in explaining changes in volatility in the sample, regardless of how expectations are formed.
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Figure 2 shows plots the smoothed estimate for the probability of being in the high volatility
regime throughout the sample for each of the three models. The middle panel also shows
the evolution of the dynamic learning gain during the same time. All three models predict
deliver strong probabilities for being in each regime for most of the sample. During the
early 1970s, middle 1970s and late 1970s and early 1980s, all models predict the economy
was in the volatile regime, with brief returns to the low volatility regime between these
times. Since 1985, all models predict the economy has remained in the low volatility regime.
These results are consistent with previous studies such as Kim and Nelson (1999a) and
Justiniano and Pimiceri (2006) which conclude changes in the volatility of exogenous shocks
are signiﬁcant in explaining time-varying macroeconomic volatility.
The expected number of quarters the U.S. economy has spent in the volatile regime can
be found by summing the probabilities for each period over the entire sample period. Doing
so reveals the economy is in the volatile regime for an expected 7.77 years under rational
expectations, 9.17 years under dynamic gain learning, and 12.26 years under constant gain
learning. The greater number of volatile periods predicted under the zero constant gain
implies the initial conditions for expectations leads to more volatile periods, and the smaller
estimate predicted under dynamic learning implies that evolving expectations may reduce
the need for the number of volatile periods. Since the dynamic learning gain is so small,
expectations are very slow to evolve, so this eﬀect still does not outweigh the eﬀect of the
initial expectations.
The plot of the dynamic learning gain in the middle panel of ﬁgure 2 demonstrates that
while the learning gain was always, there was actually little movement in the gain throughout
the sample. Since the estimate for threshold learning gain is so small, there is little it can
move as time progresses. The plot indicates that throughout the 1970s agents forecast errors
were larger than the historical average and began to decline since 1984. The learning gain
again jumped at the end of the 2001 recession and remained at the threshold level until 2003.
Figures 3, 4, and 5 show the smoothed estimated paths of the natural rate, cost push, and
monetary policy shocks, with the probability of being in the volatile regime superimposed.
The volatility of all three shocks are signiﬁcantly greater in the volatile regime under each
speciﬁcation of the model. Comparing the natural rate shock paths shows again that rational
expectations predicts much larger shocks and greater persistence than the learning models.
All models indicate recessions are characterized by negative natural interest rate shocks,
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especially the recessions in 1974 and 1981.
The cost push shocks are very similar across models, with the largest shocks occurring
during the 1970s and early 1980s. The learning models predict somewhat larger negative
cost push shocks during the 1974 and 1981 recessions. The monetary policy shocks are very
small throughout most of the sample with the exception of very volatile shocks during the
recessions of 1974, 1979, and 1981.
Figure 6 shows the evolution of agents expectations for inﬂation and output under learn-
ing and rational expectations. In each plot, the solid line represents the smoothed estimate
for the output gap and inﬂation, the dashed line represents expectations under learning,
and the dotted line represents what the rational expectation would be with the New Key-
nesian parameters estimated for each learning speciﬁcation. The results show that under
both learning models, the expectation for next period's inﬂation lags slightly behind the
rational expectation. This is to be expected, since learning expectations do not have access
to information about the shock process zt, but rational expectations does. The expectations
for inﬂation under dynamic gain learning are especially close to rational expectations, while
there is somewhat less volatility for inﬂation under the zero constant gain.
The paths of expected output under learning and rational expectations are very diﬀerent.
Under both learning frameworks the implied rational expectations are much more volatile.
Moreover, rational expectations over-estimate the output gap throughout most of the sample,
while the learning models lead to under-estimates of the output gap for much of the 1970s
and 1980s and small over-estimates during the expansionary periods of the 1960s and 1990s.
Table 6 presents a number of criteria for comparing the relative ﬁt of the three models.
The root mean squared error (RMSE) for the output gap, inﬂation, and Federal Funds rate
are all smallest under rational expectations, but only by a very small amount. To determine
if the three models adequately explain time-varying volatility, a ﬁrst order autoregression
is estimated on the squared residuals for each model. Despite the regime switching process
for stochastic volatility, the results indicate the variance of the residuals is still signiﬁcantly
positively autocorrelated for most of the cases, with the exception of the output gap under
rational expectations, and the output gap and inﬂation under constant gain learning.
Plots of the residuals in ﬁgures 7, 8, and 9 show that the largest errors for the output gap
and inﬂation are made during the 1970s and early 1980s, and very large errors are made for
the Federal Funds rate as Paul Volcker begins his tenure as chairman of the Federal Reserve.
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These failures of the model are typical for standard New Keynesian models with rational
expectations and no regime changes, indicating these extensions still do not fully explain
time-varying macroeconomic volatility.
6 Conclusion
Estimates of the New Keynesian model with dynamic gain learning and Markov-switching
volatility indicate that dynamic gain learning and expectations speciﬁed by VAR(1) estimates
on pre-sample data lead to much lower predictions for the variance of the natural rate shock
in the low and high volatility regimes, however changes in volatility in U.S. history still
depends on exogenous changes in the volatility of structural shocks. Said another way,
changes in luck is still an important empirically important explanation for time-varying
volatility, but the degree of bad luck needed is smaller under learning. Most of this decrease
in bad luck, that is the decrease in the variance of the structural shocks, is found to come
from the speciﬁcation of initial expectations, but some is explained by the time-variation
in expectations predicted by the dynamic learning gain process. Analysis of the smoothed
estimate for the evolution of the probability of being in the high volatility regime indicate
the United States was in the volatile regime during much 1970s and early 1980s, a ﬁnding
which is robust for rational expectations, constant gain learning, and dynamic gain learning.
Nonetheless, under dynamic gain learning, expectations do evolve slowly over the sample
and agents have the largest learning gain during these same periods of U.S. history.
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Figure 1: Output Gap and Inﬂation
Output Gap Inﬂation
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Table 2: Model Comparisons
Rational Expectations Dynamic Gain Constant Gain
RMSE Output Gap 3.12 3.13 3.18
RMSE Inﬂation 4.41 4.69 4.69
RMSE Federal Funds Rate 5.01 5.05 5.09
AR(1) Output Variance 0.0904 (0.0730) 0.1715 (0.0722) 0.1240 (0.0728)
AR(1) Inﬂation Variance 0.1760 (0.0716) 0.1364 (0.0699) 0.1073 (0.0653)
AR(1) Fed Funds Variance 0.3851 (0.0670) 0.3798 (0.0659) 0.3798 (0.0636)
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Figure 2: Smoothed Probability in Volatile State
Rational Expectations
Dynamic Gain Learning
Constant Gain Learning
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Figure 3: Smoothed Estimate of Natural Rate Shock
Rational Expectations
Dynamic Gain Learning
Constant Gain Learning
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Figure 4: Smoothed Estimate of Cost Push Shock
Rational Expectations
Dynamic Gain Learning
Constant Gain Learning
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Figure 5: Smoothed Estimate of Monetary Policy Shock
Rational Expectations
Dynamic Gain Learning
Constant Gain Learning
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Figure 6: Agents' Expectations
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Figure 7: One Period Ahead Output Forecast Error
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Figure 8: One Period Ahead Inﬂation Forecast Error
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Figure 9: One Period Ahead Federal Funds Rate Forecast Error
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